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Abstract 
 
Using a panel data set we investigate the specificities of the structure of monetary 
assets in transition economies. This analysis reveals the main factors standing 
behind the structure of deposits held with banks (demand or time deposits), as well 
as the determinants of the trade-off between cash and demand deposits in Central 
and Eastern European Countries and in Former Soviet Union countries. We show 
that the strong preference for cash, which appears in transition countries, is related to 
the extent of the informal sector, to the low efficiency of the banking sector as well 
as to the massive currency substitutions. The relatively high share of time deposits 
compared to demand deposits is due to the inefficiency of the banking system and to 
the low level of development of alternative financial markets.  
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1. Introduction  
 
It is well established that transition countries have typically experienced a two-stage 
process of de-monetisation and re-monetisation in the course of the past 15 years (Berglof and 
Bolton (2002), Bonin and Wachtel (2002)). First, together with high inflation and the 
disruption of the production and exchange systems in the early 90s, the velocity of money 
increased significantly, as households and firms sought to keep the nominal assets in local 
currency to a minimum, and turned to value-keeping, mainly physical, means of preserving 
wealth1. In a second stage, starting from mid-90s to post-1998 crisis with the success of 
macro-economic stabilisation policies and along with the implementation of financial reforms 
and the restructuring of the banking system, domestic liquid assets became more and more 
attractive, pushing upwards the ratio of broad money to GDP. Accordingly, transition 
countries appear to be on a convergence track towards developed economies, albeit at various 
degrees and still significantly backward (see chart below: average M2/GDP for CEECs, CIS 
and Euro area). 
Evolution of M2/GDP ratio
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Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the Annual statistical bulletins of the national central banks  
and the IFS (IMF). FSU countries: non-weighted average of Russia and Ukraine.  
 
This widely accepted story however rests entirely on a broad money concept and does 
not give account of the composition of that aggregate. As a matter of fact, if there is a global 
convergence of the ratio of broad money (say M2) to output between transition and developed 
economies, that convergence disappears when splitting M2 into its components. For instance, 
the ratios cash/GDP on the one hand and time deposits/GDP on the other hand, are both 
growing in the course of transition, whereas they show a declining trend in most developed 
economies2. Beyond the usual debate about monetization, the questions we raise in this paper 
seek to analyse the reasons and potential persistence of such a divergence. Why do people in 
transition countries keep cash money in preference to demand deposits, more than it is the 
case in the developed world? Why do they hold larger time deposits (controlling for the 
income level)? Are these patterns going to persist in the long run, or are they mostly a residual 
and transitory phenomenon? What are the variables that would explain the monetary assets 
structure and their evolution in the context of transition?  
Going deeply into cash and various types of deposits in transition economies is an 
exercise, which has not been tried much so far. There are three lines of research which might 
deal with the questions we raise, namely (i) studies on the demand for money aimed at 
understanding inflation (or monitoring money supply), (ii) works on the estimation of the 
                                                 
1 Of course, money in this conception would exclude the so-called “exotic” means of payment such as barter 
operations and payment arrears, as well as foreign currency cash or deposits. 
2 See Appendix A. 
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informal (“shadow”) economy using cash ratios, and (iii) studies on the relationship between 
economic growth and financial sector’ development, with applications to the banking reform 
in transition economies. The first line of research is rather classical and has been recently 
surveyed by Sriram (2001). The analysis promotes easy understanding of the approaches 
followed in studying the demand for money in a wide range of countries.  In a study realised 
in the context of several Central and Eastern European Countries   (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia), Kruszka (2003) shows that the main determinants of cash demand  are 
the real value of the industrial output, the nominal interest rate or the rate of inflation. More 
generally, inflation, interest and exchange rates remain , along with a transactions index, the 
basic ingredients of the money demand function. However, little is said about the structure of 
that demand for money; one exception, but rather ancient, is the analysis of Barro and 
Santomero (1972). The authors distinguish three means of holding liquid assets: cash, demand 
deposits and savings deposits; they show that the demand for money is inversely related to the 
differential of interest return between savings and demand deposits. Another conclusion of 
their study is that demand for cash is insensitive to the rate of return on alternative liquid 
assets, but is inversely dependent on the interest rate on demand deposits. And, finally, the 
ratio of currency to total money holdings is “independent” of income.  
The direction of the shadow economy has been surveyed by Schneider and Ernste 
(1998) and refers to the well-known methods developed by Feige (1979) and Guttmann 
(1977). Feige’s transaction approach consists in assuming that there is a constant relation over 
time between the volume of transactions and the GNP. The GNP in the shadow economy can 
be calculated by subtracting the official GNP from the nominal GNP. Guttmann’s currency 
demand method is one of the most commonly used approaches. It assumes that the shadow (or 
hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no 
observable traces for the authorities. It has been adapted to the treatment of transition 
countries by Hanousek and Palda (2003, 2004), who show that the currency demand methods 
are useless for the transition economies because of intensive financial innovation during 
transition. Financial innovation can destabilize money demand as these forces interfere with 
the motives of holding cash. The preference for cash may not be entirely due to tax-fraud (or 
regulation-by-passes), but more simply to the inefficiency of certain financial services and the 
underdevelopment of the banking system.  
This, in turn, leads to banking reforms, the third research topic which might be 
pertinent for the analysis of the structure of monetary assets. There is a huge set of works on 
the relations between financial development and economic growth; empirical works go in 
both directions: Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) show that the relation is positive, but 
Loayza and Ranciere (2002) show the opposite in the case of Latin America. In the case of 
transition economies, Neimke (2003) shows convincingly that there is a significant impact of 
financial development on economic growth. This however does not help us with the structure 
of money demand, since financial development is often measured by a ratio of broad money 
to GDP. More specific studies of the banking sector reforms in transition economies like those 
of Staerh (2003) or Meyendorff and Thakor (2002) focus on problems of competition, 
concentration, legal environment and banking supervision, but they do not link these industry 
structures and banks behaviour to the performance of the system in terms of the forms taken 
by money held by non-bank agents; for instance, nothing is said about the impact of the lack 
of competition between banks on the preference of households and firms to detain cash 
instead of deposits.  
To sum up, the question of the specific structure of money demand in transition 
countries, although not treated directly in the literature, might draw insights from the three 
lines of research mentioned above: first, it is clear that “classical” variables such as interest 
and/or inflation rates may have an influence on choosing the form under which liquid assets 
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should be held: non- (or little-) remunerated demand deposits, or often highly remunerated 
time deposits. Second, it is also probable that fiscal, social or regulatory evasions play a role 
in the choice between cash and any kind of deposit. Third, banking sector efficiency, for 
instance the existence (or not) of modern means of payments, credit facilities and other factors 
making the quality of a banking system, which all depend on the degree of competition 
between banks, also play a role in holding deposits with these institutions.  
The main contribution of the present paper is empirical. It consists in using the panel 
data approach to explain the structure of monetary assets in the transition economies case, 
taking the Euro zone as a benchmark. As far as we know this topic has not been dealt with so 
far. The vast majority of studies on money demand use the Johansen co-integration method 
and the Vector Error Correction Models; these are time series analyses, and they are applied 
to many transition economies, however on a case-by-case basis3. The methodology we apply 
proceeds with many countries together, also with a chronological dimension.  
Section 2 deals with a descriptive outlook (including a presentation of the data base), 
together with a brief history of financial systems in transition countries. Section 3 raises the 
question of the structure of deposits – demand or time deposits – held with banks; it proposes 
to explain the share of time deposits in total deposits using a function of demand for money, 
and tests whether transition countries behave the same way developed countries do in this 
respect. Section 4 deals with the question of the distribution of M1 between cash and demand 
deposits: both assets do not yield any interest and the cost of holding them – inflation – is the 
same; in that case, shadow economy plus banking efficiency are proposed as the main 
variables influencing the choice. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Financial systems in transition countries 
 
Are financial systems specific in transition countries, and in what way? Transition is 
usually defined a long term process by which, according to the EBRD:  
- Enterprises are being privatized, their governance is improved and hard budget 
constraint is imposed.  
- Markets are liberalized, both internal and foreign, together with the setting up of the 
necessary regulation agencies.  
- Financial markets are liberalized, both with the banking system and with securities 
markets.  
- Infrastructures are reformed.  
It is on the basis of these orientations that the EBRD calculates the so-called “reform 
indicators” which are attributed to each transition country. Summing (arithmetically) the nine 
corresponding indicators leads to a spectrum of 9 (minimal note) to 40,5 (maximum) ; the 
least advanced country (Turkmenistan) hardly reaches 12 in 2004; Belarus, another well 
known laggard, has 17,5. That transition is really a long term process is shown by the fact 
that, after 14 years of transition, the most advanced countries – Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary – have not yet reached the maximal note, which is defined as “standards typical of 
advanced industrial economies”4.  
Now, what is the role of transition in this institutional backwardness, and what is the role 
of underdevelopment (the GDP per capita of the most advanced transition countries remains 
at half the level of high income countries). Would the notes of the bulk of emerging market 
economies be very different from the ones of emerging transition economies? Judging from 
                                                 
3 See Van Aarle and Budina (1995), Cuthbertson and Bredin (2001), Kruszka (2003). 
4 Poland is at 34, Czech Republic and Hungary are at 35. Slovenia is far behind at 31,5. Figures drawn from 
Transition Report 2004, p6; the methodology of calculation of the 9 reform indicators is on pages 199-200.  
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the listing of the quite famous “Washington consensus”, a document which was established 
by John Williamson before the fall of the Berlin wall and was targeted to pinpoint the 
necessary reforms in the developing world (particularly Latin America), the reform agenda of 
developing market economies looked very similar to the one which would be set up a few 
months later for transition countries5.  
There is however a matter of degree in these reforms. The Washington consensus has 
among its ten proposed “reforms” a line called “financial liberalization”; on the EBRD’s list 
of reform indicators, this line is also present, even if it is sub-divided into the two main 
compartments of the financial sector, banks and securities markets. But J. Williamson’s 
financial liberalization is aimed at establishing market-determined interest rates, and two 
measures on which he insists is on the scheduling (premature opening of the capital account 
with banks not robust enough to intermediate capital inflows efficiently has proved disastrous 
for certain countries) and on reinforcing prudential supervision. In contrast, financial reform 
in transition countries starts from scratch, everything has to be built.  
Before transition, the banking system of communist countries was organized under the 
form of a ‘mono-bank’. The ‘mono-bank’ took deposits from households but decisions on the 
distribution of credit belonged to the central planning office. Credit was underwritten by the 
state, and bank officials had no incentive to stop or develop credit. Credit was available nearly 
for free, so that there was practically no time constraint on performances of firms. The mono-
bank created as much credit as was required without being constrained by the opportunity cost 
of funds or the need to evaluate lending risk. Consequently, the flow of funds involving 
households, the mono-bank, planning agencies and industrial firms led to the gradual increase 
of bad and unserviceable loans. As a result, inflation pressure increased, first under the form 
of shortages, later in an open form.  
With transition, the financial sector reform in CEECs and the CIS began by the separation 
of the banking sector into two tiers: central and commercial banks. The aim was to separate 
the sovereign functions of monetary policy and banking supervision on the one side, from the 
commercial activity of lending and deposits transformation on the other side. Commercial 
banks remained however mainly state-owned at that initial stage, and the practice of directed 
credits and control on interest rates persisted extensively. Thus banking systems were 
confronted with much of the same old problems: bad loans, low savings and investment 
levels, illiquid security markets that provide little capital. Although each transition country 
chose its approach in progressing with the reforms of the financial sector, many countries 
gradually cut or reduced subsidies to enterprises, making them more reliant on non-state 
financial sources. For instance, in Romania and the Czech Republic, the outside financing 
became more important after the beginning of the financial sector reform.  
The key issues relating to bank restructuring in the second stage of transition include 
the following actions: solving the banks’ bad loans issue and limiting instruments of “soft 
budget constraint”; developing financial markets for equities and other securities; and 
building institutions aimed at the supervision of banks and regulation of financial markets. 
Starting from a relatively low rate of savings, transition economies have both to enhance an 
efficient transformation of domestic savings into long-term investments order, and attracting 
as much foreign capital as possible. Whereas capital flows and foreign direct investments play 
                                                 
5 Up to the point that many specialists believe that the Washington Consensus is something that has been devised 
primarily for transition countries (it is then presented in a caricatural way with the triad “liberalization / 
stabilization / privatization”) and is often associated with the so-called “shock therapy”. See John Williamson, 
“A short History of the Washington Consensus”, Paper commissioned by Foundation CIDOB for the Conference 
“From the Washington Consensus towards a New Global Governance”, Barcelona, September 24-25, 2004. And 
John Williamson, “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development”, a lecture in the series 
“Practitioners of Development” delivered at the World Bank on January 13, 2004.  
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a crucial role in the development of transition countries, higher and sustained growth rate will 
be obtained in the long run through a build-up of domestic savings.  
In order to realise this scenario, the banking sector has to be restructured and it has to 
be independent from the political regime. This means privatisation of banks, enhancing 
competition and plugging the financial system to international financial markets. In the course 
of implementing this programme, the bulk of transition countries have encountered one or 
several crises (of various degrees of severity) during the 90’s. Several factors have triggered 
these financial crises in the transition economies:  
- in certain cases, after the East Asian crisis of 1997, international investors who had 
previously transferred large amounts of short term capital to transition economies withdrew 
these investments and, by a movement which has been coined as “flight to quality”, moved 
them to developed countries financial markets. Consequently, several transition countries 
have been touched by some external idiosyncratic shocks (cases of Russia and Ukraine in 
1998). In that case, there is a similarity with the crisis of non-transition emerging economies.  
- in other cases however, the crisis was the effect of transition itself: several 
commercial banks were created on the basis of old state-owned banks. They inherited large 
portfolios of credits to state-owned enterprises, which permanently rolled over theirs debts. 
The transition process, by which subsidies were gradually removed and internal and external 
competition rose, drastically reduced the firms profitability. The rollover of credits became 
clearly non-sustainable, which triggered a crisis both in the industrial and in the banking 
sectors (cases of Bulgaria in 1996 and the Czech Republic in 1997).  
Despite major progresses in the reform of banking sectors in these economies, 
including the privatization of many state-owned banks, the entry of successful de novo 
competitors and the development of regulatory and supervisory capabilities, there was little 
financial deepening, as reflected in the level of monetization which remained at a low level. 
Graph 1 above showed that the ratio of M2 to GDP remained at approximately half of the 
Euro area average, and the situation is similar for M1. In 2003, the ratio of M1 to GDP was 
16,4 percent in Russia, 19,3 percent in Hungary and 33,6 percent in the Czech Republic (the 
most advanced transition country from that point of view), compared to 37,5 percent as an 
average for the euro area, as can be seen in the graph below.  
Evolution of M1/GDP ratio
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
year
M1 (%GDP)
CEEC
FSU
euro area
 
Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the Annual statistical bulletins  
of the national central banks and the IFS (IMF). FSU: see graph 1  
 
This choppy evolution of overall monetization in transition economies came together 
with a specific structuring of money balances. The weakness of the banking sector and 
financial markets led economic agents to behave in a particular way when decisions about 
which assets, cash, demand deposits or time deposits, should be held. We focus in this paper 
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not on the global degree of monetization of the economies but rather on its structure. Our 
topic is the structure of monetary assets (cash and various deposits held with banks).  
The data set we are using in this analysis is built as a panel of yearly country 
observations drawn from the Annual statistical bulletins of the National Central Banks, the 
European Central Bank’ Blue Book, the World Bank’ World Development Indicators, the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, the EBRD Transition Reports 6 and includes 14 countries7 
over the period 1993-2004. In this respect, the table below shows a descriptive and summary 
outlook of the situation of the countries under review (averages for the two categories of 
transition countries are non weighted averages; the line ‘euro area’ is not an average but the 
data for the whole area). The first part of the table shows the structure of liquid assets (share 
of cash in M1) and the second part of the table shows the structure of deposits (share of 
demand deposits in total deposits):  
Table A. 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
M0/M1                       
CEEC 0,38 0,38 0,39 0,37 0,37 0,39 0,40 0,39 0,38 0,36 0,34
FSU n.a. n.a. 0,55 0,59 0,57 0,63 0,60 0,56 0,58 0,59 0,58
Euro area 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,11 0,14 0,15
Demand deposits to total deposits ratio                   
CEEC 0,44 0,41 0,38 0,39 0,38 0,34 0,33 0,32 0,32 0,35 0,38
FSU n.a. n.a. 0,42 0,40 0,48 0,36 0,36 0,41 0,39 0,36 0,34
Euro area 0,24 0,25 0,33 0,35 0,38 0,39 0,42 0,43 0,45 0,45 0,47
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on the Annual statistical bulletins of the national central banks and the IFS 
(IMF). 
 
As can be seen, over the period, the euro area countries reduced by almost a third the 
share of cash in M1. The larger decrease is taking place in 2001 when cash Euros were 
introduced8. As the banking system has done the major part of the conversion, some of the 
cash came on the deposits. The evolution of this ratio is rather stable in the CEECs and in the 
FSU countries, but at a much bigger scale. The share of demand deposits in total deposits has 
slowly reduced in the CEECs and in the FSU countries, but we observe an inverse evolution 
of this ratio in the euro area. This implied that the households and enterprises put 
progressively their savings in banks instead of keeping them in demand deposits. The little 
development of the stock market in transition countries suggests that there is no major 
alternative investment. The euro zone is presented in order to have a benchmark and a 
comparative trend. In the euro zone cash is still on very low and decreasing trend, time 
deposits are decreasing due to alternative more profitable investment, as for example in stock 
markets. 
 
In order to explain the share of different kinds of money balances, we take as a starting 
point the demand for money function. Money demand has been the center of the macro-policy 
debate since Keynes’ General Theory has become the standard macroeconomic version of the 
theory. According to Keynes, there are three motifs that generally justify the economic agents 
money holdings. First, there is the facility that they introduce in transactions. This approach is 
called the inventory money demand. The amount of money holdings is determined by the 
                                                 
6 See Appendix B for a more precise description of the data set (both on the way indicators were built and on 
data sources).  
7 The analysis is realized over 11 CEECs (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia), 2 FSU countries (Russia and Ukraine) and the euro-zone 
(as an average for the 15 countries). 
8 See Willem F. Duisenberg (2002). 
 7
trade-off between the implicit cost of holding it (the interest lost) and the transaction costs 
carried out by the conversion of interest gain assets into money. The inventory theory of 
money demand can be enlarged to capture the uncertainty of receipts and spending flows and 
the lack of liquidity risk. Called precautionary motive, this second factor generally leads to a 
prediction of a positive link between money demand and the uncertainty of the economic 
climate. A third approach is based on the theory of portfolio management; it considers money 
as an asset amongst many others. The agents diversify their assets on the basis of their returns 
(inexistent for the cash balances, nominal return for the bonds) and the related risks. 
According to Keynes, uncertainty plays an important role in decision – taking process, so that 
the precautionary and speculative demand for money should be considered very instable. On 
the opposite, monetarists insisted on the stability of money demand; in their view the 
transaction motif is the base of the demand for money (Burda and Wyplosz (2003)). 
Duca and Vanhoose (2004) offer a brief summary of the models promoted in the demand 
for money analysis. These are grouped in three categories: the overlapping-generations 
models, the shopping-time models and the cash-in-advance models. All these models present 
some inconvenients. The overlapping-generation models are unsuitable for explaining the 
demand for assets as means of exchange. Shopping time models produce predictions that can 
be obtained from money-in-the-utility-function approaches. Cash-in-advance models have 
been the easiest to incorporate into dynamic macro theories, but the approach of money as a 
residual is at odds with explaining agent rational decisions. Recently, there is a rebirth of 
interest in the inventory approach of money demand. 
It has been stated over the years that a stable money demand function is a necessary 
condition so that money exerts a predictable influence on the economy (Friedman). Since 
“stability” does not necessarily mean “simplicity”, it becomes accepted that this demand 
function should be linear (or linear in the logs) and should have a small set of variables as 
arguments; these arguments should represent significant links to spending and economic 
activity in other economic sectors (see Laidler (1974), Judd and Scadding(1982), Barnett, 
Fisher and Serletis (1992)). 
There are certain controversial aspects related to the money demand function. First, there 
is the definition of money: should it be the narrow money so that it includes only the current 
means of payment (this is the transaction theory case) or should it be enlarged to capture some 
liquid substitutes such as the saving deposits? At the beginning, the last aspect was considered 
impossible by the general theory of assets. The second and third controversial aspects concern 
the arguments of the money demand function. First, there is the question of choosing the scale 
variables. According to the transaction theory this variable is represented by a measure of 
transaction; the assets theory considers the wealth as appropriate. Then, there is the measure 
of the opportunity cost of holding money. Generally, transaction theories suggest that the 
short-run securities (the treasury bills) are the closest alternative for holding money. Assets 
theories considered impossible the returns on long-run financial assets or even on equities or 
real capital, as all these constitute potential substitutes for money. 
The empirical modeling of money is typically based on the transactions demand (see 
Ericsson (1998)). We will therefore proceed with this approach in our analysis and, 
consequently, the function of money demand takes the following form: ( tittti RYLPM ,, ,*= )                                                                                                        (1), 
where  –the nominal money balances; – the price level index; - the real 
income; -the short-run nominal interest rate (% per annum). We adopt the Fischer 
hypothesis according to which the nominal interest rate, , consists of the real interest rate 
and the compensation for the expected inflation; there is no need to consider the rate of 
inflation 
tiM ,
ti ,
ti,
tP tiY ,
R
tiR ,
π  as a specific factor of demand for real cash balances. 
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It is stated in the theory that money demand (measured by M1 or M2) increases with the 
real income and decreases with the nominal interest rate. When proceeding to a desegregation 
of money into different monetary components, we have the following functions: ( tattta RYLaPM ,, ,*= )
)
                                                                                                            (2), 
( tbtttb RYLbPM ,, ,*=                                                                                                             (3), 
where  –the demand for monetary assets a or b; – the price level index; Y -
the real income; and -the opportunity costs of holding the monetary assets a or b. 
tbta MM ,, ,
R
tP ti ,
ta , tbR ,
The ratio of these monetary assets will be: 
)21()2(
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M                      (4), 
where represent some other factors influencing the demand for the monetary assets a or b. tθ
The log-linear form of the equation (4) is: 
( ) tttbtat
tb
ta RRYM
M εθωωβαβα +−+−++−= ln)21(ln)2(ln2ln11ln ,,
,
,                                   (5), 
where tε - the error term. 
The equation (5) can be written in a simple way: 
tttbtat
tb
ta RRYM
M εΠγγγγγ +++++= 4,3,210
,
, lnlnlnln                                                            (6), 
where - some other factors influencing the demand for the monetary assets a or b. tΠ
The income elasticity of the money demand is generally positive9. It is stated that its 
coefficient ( ) should be situated between 0.5 – 1.0 and those of the interest rate elasticity 
( ) in an interval going from –0.1 to –0.5. The coefficient of the other factors influencing 
the demand for monetary assets a and b ( ) depends on the choice of their measure. 
1γ
32,γγ
4γ
 
We proceed with a two steps analysis. First, we analyze the trade-off between detaining 
money as a store of value or as a means of transaction. Secondly, we focus on the means of 
transaction and we seek to determine if this means is used inside or outside the banking 
system. Consequently, we first analyze the determinants of the ratio of demand deposits to 
total deposits, and, then, those of the cash to M1 ratio.10 These ratios take the form of the 
equation (6). According to the transaction approach of money demand, we use the real income 
as a scale variable, here approximated by the real GDP per capita. The nominal interest rate is 
the opportunity cost of holding money; we use the deposit rate (from the International 
Financial Statistics (IMF)). The empirical method applied is the panel data analysis.11 We use 
the Feasible General Least Square (FGLS) method for the estimation of the equations, which 
allows controlling for the residuals heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The results are 
presented in the Sections 3 and 4. 
 
 
3. The structure of deposits held with banks: why do people choose the demand deposits 
or the time deposits?  
 
By analyzing the arbitrage between money as a store of value and money as a means of 
transaction, we actually explore the structure of deposits held with banks. The ratio of demand 
deposits to total deposits takes the following form: 
                                                 
9 When the money demand is the monetary aggregate M1 or M2. 
10 The two ratios are calculated by dividing indicators expressed in national currency. 
11 The span of time covers 12 years and the sample consists of 14 countries. 
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where  -the opportunity cost of holding the asset M1;  -the opportunity cost of 
holding the asset M2; - refers to some other variables which may influence the ratio of 
demand to total deposits (the interest differential between time and demand deposits, the stock 
exchange prices volatility, the financial market development).The results of the estimations 
are presented in the table below (table1). First, we estimate the simple regression of money 
demand. This includes as explanatory variables the real GDP per capita, the interest rate on 
time deposits and the dummy euro- area variable. We gradually introduce the opportunity 
costs of detaining demand deposits relative to other alternative assets – here the government 
bonds (regression 2). As Judd and Scadding (1982), we consider inappropriate to include in 
the estimations, simultaneously, the two interest rates because of the high colinearity 
(0,8126). However, there are analysis that include simultaneously several interest rates, like 
those of Cooley and LeRoy (1981), Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), Ericsson(1998). In the 
regression 4 we take the interest on treasury bills as the opportunity cost of holding demand 
deposits. Regression 4 shows the influence of the credit transfers (as % of GDP). 
tR ,1 tR ,2
tΠ
 
Table 1. The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (in national currency) 12 
Dependent variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
Demand deposits/total deposits FGLS  FGLS FGLS FGLS   
Scale variable       
GDP per capita -0.223 -0.113 -0.163 -0.818   
 (3.33)*** (2.35)*** (2.12)*** (11.03)***   
Opportunity cost of holding money       
               Interest rate -0.147   -0.353   
               on time deposits (4.53)***   (8.55)***   
  Government bonds  -0.088     
               Yielda  (2.39)**     
               Treasury bills   -0.110    
               Yielda1   (2.61)***    
Other influencing factors        
Credit transfers    0.045   
                (% of GDP)    (3.08)***   
    Dummy euro area 0.181 0.290     
 (1.20) (2.62)***     
                Intercept 1.13 -0.029 0.552 6.42   
 (1.93)* (0.07) (0.79) (9.52)***   
Tests       
 Hausman testb (p-value) 0.6927 0.9290 0.6705 0.1039   
 Breusch-Pagan LM testc 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
          Wooldridge testd 0.0029 0.0659 0.0000 0.0895   
          LR teste 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0065   
       
Observations 163 106 93 86   
Number of countries 14 12 9 9   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a data missing in the case of Hungary and Croatia. 
a1 data missing in the case of Estonia, Croatia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine and the Euro-area. 
b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects. 
c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0). 
d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order serial autocorrelation. 
e the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity. 
                                                 
12 The estimations including inflation rate and those related to the market capitalization of listed companies (as 
% of GDP) are not significant. 
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The Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests indicate the appropriate use of random effects. 
The Wooldridge test shows the absence of serial correlation in the regressions (1) and (4), 
while in others there is serial correlation. The heteroskedasticity test (LR test) shows its 
presence in all the estimations. In order to control for these, we use the FGLS method. 
As one can see: 
- the income elasticity is negative and significant (going from –0.11 to –0.81). Usually a 
high GDP corresponds to a developed financial and banking system. Consequently, a 
larger use of banking and financial market products and services may explain the 
negative sign of the coefficient. 
- analysing the interest rate elasticities, we see that they are consistent with theoretical 
postulates. Taking into account the nominal deposit rate13, one can expect that its 
growth should encourage saving money on bank accounts -that is getting rid of the 
most liquid monetary measure. Negative signs of coefficients of  support entirely 
this conclusion. The increase of  by 1 percent should not decrease the ratio of 
demand deposits to total deposits by more than 0.353 percent. The second tested 
measure of an opportunity cost of holding money is the interest on government bonds 
(regression (2)). The interest elasticity associated to this measure is negative and 
significant (-0.088), as expected. The higher the interest paid on government bonds, 
the smaller the incentive of detaining demand deposits. We introduce another measure 
for the opportunity cost of holding money – the treasury bills yield (regression (3)); 
the higher this interest, the smaller the incentive of detaining demand deposits. 
tiR ,
tiR ,
We use the Euro area as a “benchmark” by the means of a dummy variable. The 
coefficients of this variable are positive and significant in the regression (2), confirming the 
data presented in the table A; the use of demand deposits is larger in the Euro area countries. 
The dummy variable does not appear in the last two regressions ((3) and (4)) because of the 
lack of data for the euro-area. 
There are some other determinants of the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits in 
national currency. First, we wonder whether demand deposits provide an adequate return. The 
existence of an interest rate on demand deposits will definitely influence the choice between 
the two categories of deposits. We couldn’t introduce it in our estimations because of the data 
unavailability. Second, does the development of the financial market influence agents’ choice 
between demand and time deposits? In order to answer this question, we propose to use an 
indicator that captures the financial market development. This is the market capitalization of 
listed companies (as % of GDP); normally, a developed financial market offers a large sample 
of services so that the use of demand deposits is reduced. The estimations show that the 
results are not significant. And, last not least, we wonder whether credit transfers that are 
“feeding” the current account influence one way or another the trade-off between demand and 
time deposits. Due to lack of data, we estimate the influence of credits transfers (as % of 
GDP) on the demand to total deposits ratio for only 9 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia). This estimation (see 
regression (5)) shows the expected positive and significant coefficient for the value of credit 
transfers (as % of GDP). The larger the value of these payment orders the larger is the use of 
current accounts (demand deposits).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Deposit rate is the rate offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits (IFS (IMF) 
definition). 
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4. The distribution of M1 between cash and demand deposits in national currency 
 
In the pre-transition period, the banking sector was made up by a handful of state-
owned savings and loans type banks. Due to lack of competition, the scope of banking 
services was very limited. Following transition, foreign banks have entered financial markets 
and introduced competition. Competition narrows the gap between the level of financial 
services provided in transition and in the developed economies. Some products, such as 
cheques were never introduced in transition countries, as they were already outdated and 
superceded by credit and debit cards.  
There are a lot of situations in which money demand changes during transition: 
a) a lack of credit is a feature of early transition economies and forces people to hold 
cash. As credit widens, cash balances fall. Bank failures during transition can force 
agents to change their cash-holding strategies towards holding increasing amounts of 
cash. At the same time, transition economies experience great ups and downs in taxes. 
These taxes will in turn move people to transact in cash in order to avoid their 
obligations to government.  
b) At certain periods, the real interest rate was negative in several transition economies. 
Does a negative real interest rate stimulate people out of demand deposits and into 
cash holdings? The answer is clearly “no”, since holding cash gives a zero nominal 
return which is anyway inferior to the positive – although low – nominal return given 
by deposits. 
c) Changes in bank regulation determine changes in the currency to demand deposits that 
are hard to measure. Many transition countries changed their regulations quite 
frequently. 
d) Banking crises occurred in almost all transition countries in the 1990s. The loss and 
return of depositor confidence was bound to at first raise, and then depress the 
currency to demand deposits ratio in ways that are hard to measure. 
To get a feeling for the volatility of currency to demand deposits consider the figure 
below: 
Evolution of cash/demand deposits ratio
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Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the Annual statistical bulletins 
of the national central banks and the  IFS(FMI). 
 
The pattern of currency to demand deposits ratios is diverse in the analyzed countries. In 
the CEECs the average ratio is volatile, starting from 82,7 percent in 1993 and reaching 61,4 
percent in 2003. The ratio is significantly volatile in the FSU countries, reaching the higher 
level at the outset of the banking crisis (177,7 percent). The countries of the euro area 
experienced a decline in the ratio, from 34,9 percent in 1993 to 8 percent in 2003. The 
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volatility in the currency to demand deposit ratio, in the transition economies, is explained by 
shocks in monetary and financial sector. 
 
As stated before, we are interested in the money demand as a means of transaction The 
analysis of money as a means of transactions imposes the comparison between money used 
through the banking system and money used outside the banking system. Consequently, we 
focus on the determinants of the ratio of cash to M1 (in national currency): 
ttttt
t
t RRYM
M εΠγγγγγ +++++= 4,13,0210
,1
,0 lnlnlnln                                                             (8) 
where  the opportunity cost of holding cash;  the opportunity cost of holding the 
asset M1;  refers to other variables influencing the trade-off between cash and demand 
deposits, such as the informal economy, the efficiency of the banking sector (test in table 3). 
The expectations are of a negative value for the coefficient of the GDP per capita (
tR ,0 tR ,1
tΠ
1γ ). The 
banking intermediation is increasing with the income level. In principle the interest rate 
should not affect this ratio ( 2γ  and 3γ  are expected to be non-significant). There is no return 
for the cash in circulation and, in general the return for demand deposits, when it exists, is 
quite small. The results of the estimations are presented in the table 2. We keep exactly the 
same structure of the estimates equations. First, the explanatory variables are the real GDP per 
capita, the interest rate on time deposits and the dummy for the euro area. Than, we introduce 
the interest rate on government bonds (regression (7)). In the regression (8) we have the 
treasury bills yield as an opportunity cost of holding money. 
 
Table 2. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) 
Dependent variable:  (6) (7) (8)a1  
Cash/M1 FGLS FGLS FGLS  
Scale variable      
GDP per capita -0.218 -0.253 -0.284    
 (6.24)*** (5.83)*** (8.04)***  
Opportunity cost of holding money       
                Interest rate -0.019      
on time deposits (1.20)      
     Government bonds  0.027     
                Yielda  (1.68)   
               Treasury bills   -0.022    
               Yielda1   (1.28)  
Other influencing factors     
Dummy euro area 0.035 0.032     
 (0.19) (0.14)   
               Intercept 1.145 1.138 1.697    
 (3.79)*** (3.55)*** (5.47)***  
Tests     
Hausman testb (p-value) 0.5295 0.9337 0.0278    
Breusch-Pagan LM testc 0.0000 0.0000   
         Wooldridge testd 0.0005 0.0009 0.0143  
         LR teste 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
     
Observations 163 106 93  
Number of countries 14 12 9    
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a data missing in the case of Hungary and Croatia. 
a1 data missing in the case of Estonia, Croatia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine and the Euro-area. 
b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects. 
c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0). 
d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order serial autocorrelation. 
e the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity. 
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The Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests indicate the appropriateness’ use of random 
effects (exception regression(8)). The Wooldridge test shows the presence of serial correlation 
in all the estimations. The heteroskedasticity test (LR test) shows its presence in all the 
estimations. In order to control for these aspects we use the FGLS method. 
As we can see: 
- the income elasticity is negative and significant (going from –0.21 to –0.28). When 
GDP per capita is high, cash is less used then demand deposits. Usually a high GDP 
corresponds to a developed financial and banking system, and, as a consequence, to a 
larger use of the banking system’ product and services. Therefore, the use of cash is 
reduced.  
- the interest rate on time deposits presents a non- significant coefficient. As for the 
interest paid on government bonds, this does not seem to affect the cash to M1 ratio. 
When we take in consideration the treasury bills yield (regression (8)), this does not 
influence the detention of cash. The results confirm the expectations – the interest 
rates do not affect the ratio of cash to M1 (see regressions (6), (7) and (8)). 
- The dummy variable for the Euro area is not significant in none of the regressions. 
There are some other indicators influencing the ratio of cash to M1. According to Cagan 
(1958), the informal sector is one of the main determinants of the ratio. We will therefore 
proceed by introducing the index of the informal sector published by the Heritage Foundation 
(regression (9)). The efficiency of the banking sector is another determining factor. 
Consequently, we introduce the EBRD index of banking reform and the interest rate spread 
(regression (10) and (11)). The currency substitution is also an influencing factor. In transition 
countries, most studies use the ratio of foreign currency deposits to M2 as a proxy of the level 
of currency substitution or dollarisation. This measure does not seem adequate however, 
because it omits the foreign currency cash in circulation, which flaws the extent of 
dollarisation. Some studies use the ratio of foreign currency deposits to the monetary 
aggregate M2D (which is the sum of M1 and of time deposits in local currency)14 (Sarajevs 
(2000), IMF studies). We consider this measure as inappropriate as the previous one. In total, 
we prefer to use a measure of dollarisation, which relates foreign currency deposits to total 
deposits (Mongardini and Mueller (1999)) (regression (12)). We realize the empirical analysis 
for determining the potential influence of all these “other” factors (see table 3). 
 
Table 3. The ratio of cash to monetary aggregate M1 (in national currency) 
Dependent variable:  (9) (10) (11)a (12)  
Cash/M1 FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS  
Scale variable      
GDP per capita -0.204 -0.189 -0.167 -0.065  
 (7.09)*** (5.83)*** (4.91)*** (2.54)**  
Other influencing factors      
Informal sector 0.044     
 (2.13)**     
EBRD banking   -0.055   
         reform indexa   (2.23)**   
         Interest rate  0.041    
         spread  (1.87)*    
         Dollarisation    0.359  
    (11.08)***  
Dummy euro area 0.130 0.036  -0.450  
 (0.89) (0.21)  (2.65)**  
       Intercept 0.813 0.741 0.829 0.315  
                                                 
14 M1 is the sum of cash and demand deposits in local currency, so that the M2D appears as a measure of the 
domestic supply of money. 
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 (3.06)** (2.55)** (3.41)** (1.60)  
Tests      
 Hausman testb (p-value) 0.0000 0.3104 0.3636 0.5129  
 Breusch- Pagan LM testc  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
 Wooldridge testd(p-value) 0.0004 0.0005 0.0013 0.0009  
 LR testf (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Observations 165 162 154 165  
Number of countries 14 14 13 14  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a data missing in the case of the euro area. 
b the null hypothesis is that of the absence of fixed effects. 
c the null hypothesis is that of no random effects (var[u]=0). 
d the null hypothesis is that of no first-order autocorrelation. 
f the null hypothesis is that of homoskedasticity. 
Once again, the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests indicate the appropriateness’ use 
of random effects (exception – regression (9)). The Wooldridge test shows the presence of 
serial correlation in all the estimations. The heteroskedasticity test (LR test) shows its 
presence in all the estimations. In order to control for these aspects we use the FGLS method. 
The results are the following: 
- we find a positive and significant effect of the informal sector on the analyzed ratio 
(regression (9)). This means that the bigger the informal sector in the economy, the 
larger is the use of cash compared to demand deposits. Not surprisingly cash is much 
more used in the informal sector, in order to avoid taxes and state controls in such 
activities. 
- the well-implemented reform, illustrated by a high EBRD index of banking reform, is 
associated to a small ratio of cash to M1 in national currency (see regression (11)). 
People’s confidence in the banking system is higher and, consequently, they rely more 
on the banking system. In the case of the interest rate spread the expectations are that 
the bigger is this spread, the bigger is the use of cash. A high interest rate spread is the 
synonym of an inefficient banking system and this explains the reduced use of the 
banking services and products (see also Duchêne, Jimborean and Najman (2005)). The 
estimations confirm the expectations (regression (10)). 
- the coefficient of the dollarisation ratio is significant and positive. This means that the 
larger the currency substitution, the higher is the ratio of cash to M1 in national 
currency. What can be the explanations? As stated in the literature, the massive 
currency substitution was due to hyper- inflation episodes during the transition process 
in some Central and Eastern European Countries. Keeping deposits in dollars is often 
used as a way to seek a protection against inflation and exchange rate depreciation 
risks. So, the deeper is the monetary instability (which appears in high dollarisation 
ratios), the larger is the use of cash. 
- the dummy for the Euro area is negative and significant only in the regressions (12) 
confirming that cash is less used in the Euro area countries, where there are a lot of 
alternative ways of placements. 
 
There are some other indicators that can be used in order to reflect the efficiency of the 
banking system. These are related to the use of payment instruments, such as credit and debit 
cards, credit transfers and direct debits, ATM’s network and POS terminals. In an economy 
where there is a large use of these instruments there is a smaller need of money to finance the 
business activities compared to an economy where all the payments are realized in cash. As in 
the case of the first analyzed ratio (demand deposits/total deposits), we have estimated the 
cash /M1 ratio as a function of the value of credit transfers (in % of GDP) and then of the 
number of ATMS with a card dispensing function per 1000000 inhabitants, but the results are 
not significant. One possible explanation comes from the fact that we do not dispose of data 
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for the whole sample. In a future version we intend to enlarge the data basis so that the 
analysis should be ameliorated.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Why do people in transition countries keep cash money in preference to demand 
deposits more than it is the case in the developed world? This was the starting point in our 
analysis.  
As far as the tests and the statistical data show, cash is more preferred in the FSU 
countries than in the CEECs. The large informal sector, the low efficiency of the banking 
system and the currency substitution process are the main explanations for the high ratio of 
cash to M1 in all transition countries. 
Demand deposits are not the predominant form of deposits in neither of these 
countries. Why do people prefer time deposits? The high interest rate paid by the banks can 
explain this form of detaining money. Another possible explanation is the lack of alternative 
ways of investment placements, the financial markets being little developed and in an 
incipient stage in these countries.  
Can we speak of an inefficiency of the banking system in transition countries? It is 
rather an under-development, which is due to a “more recent” banking reform. We assist in 
these economies at the creation of the two-tiers system only at the end of the 80s; at this time, 
the developed economies have already had in place well regulated and wealthy banking and 
financial systems. These specificities of the banking systems in transition can be an 
explanation of the large use of cash. There are surely some other factors that determine the 
trade-off between cash and the use of banking services and products; a future analysis will 
deeply clarify this aspect. 
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Appendix A. 
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Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the Annual statistical bulletins of the national central banks and IFS 
(IMF). 
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Source: Authors’ calculation, based on the Annual statistical bulletins of the national central banks and 
IFS (IMF). 
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Appendix B. Data sources 
 
 
Cash currency outside banks (end-of-year),  Annual bulletins of central banks 
Demand 
deposits demand deposits (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks 
demdepnat overnight deposits in national currency, end-of-year 
demdepfor overnight deposits in foreign currency, end-of-year 
M1 monetary aggregate M1, end-of-year, Annual bulletins of central banks 
M2 monetary aggregate M2, end-of-year, Annual bulletins of central banks 
Time deposits quasi-money, end-of-year; or time deposits =M2-M1 
Timefordep time deposits in foreign currency (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks 
Timedepnat time deposits in national currency (end-of-year), Annual bulletins of central banks 
infl CPI  inflation rate, CPI (annual %, end-of-period),  Estonia - BERD 
Informal 
sector 
Index of Economic Freedom, informal market grading scale 
 
 1  Very low   - country has a free-market economy with informal market in such things as drugs and weapons 
 1.5 – 2 Low - country may have some informal market involvement in labor or pirating of intellectual property 
 2.5 – 3 
Moderate - country may have some informal market activities in labor, agriculture and transportation and  
moderate levels of intellectual property rights 
 3.5 – 4 
High - country may have substantial levels of informal market activity in such areas as labor, pirated intellectual
property and smuggled consumer goods, and in such 
services as transportation, electricity and telecommunications 
 4.5 – 5 Very high - country's informal market is larger than its formal economy 
Bankref 
 
 
 
EBRD index of banking sector reform (1-little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system; 2 – significant 
 liberalisation of interest rate and credit allocation; 3-substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and 
 of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; 4-significant movement of banking laws and regulations
 towards BIS standards) 
Irs 
 
interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate): Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on  
loans to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by  
commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. World Bank data 
Gdpcap GDP per capita ($), Transition Report 
Depositrate 
 
 
 
 
IFS(FMI), rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or saving deposits. Often, rates for time and saving
deposits are classified according to maturity and amounts deposited. In addition, deposit money bank and similar  
deposit-taking institutions may offer short and medium-term instruments at specified rates for specific amounts and
maturities; these are frequently termed "certificates of deposits". for countries where savings deposits are important,
 a Saving Rate (line 60k) is also published. 
Lendingrate 
IFS(FMI), the bank rate that usually meets the short and medium term financing needs of the private sector. This 
 rate is normally differentiated according to creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. 
ATMc number of ATMS with a card dispensing function per 1000000 inhabitants, end of year, own calculation 
credittransfer credit transfers value (as % of GDP), ECB (Blue Book) 
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